



Factors affecting Australia's defence, 1941-43

- 01** Churchill convinced Roosevelt to adopt a **Germany First** strategy that relegated the SW Pacific to secondary status.

1 Arcadia Conference, December 1941
- 02** Japanese War Planning to occupy New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia to isolate Australia from the US and bring Australia under Japanese control by blockage and psywar.

2 Japanese Operation FS, Nov. 1941
- 03** The US Navy was determined to use its assets to preserve Australia, Papua and the lower Solomon Islands for use as offensive launch pads against Japan.

3 U.S. Navy's Pacific War Campaign Plan, December 1941

To counter the threat from Australia as an American ally...

Japan's Navy General Staff and Navy Ministry wanted to invade key areas of the northern Australian mainland in early 1942 to isolate Australia from American and British aid.

Japan's Army General Staff felt that Australia could be pressured into surrender to Japan by isolating it completely from the United States as part of an intensified blockade, and by applying intense psychological pressure.

This became Operation FS.

But there was **ANOTHER** factor that affected Australia's defence as well....



General Douglas MacArthur

26 January 1880 – 5 April 1964

Son of Lieut. General Arthur MacArthur, Jr., Medal of Honor

Self-styled “Hero of the Philippines”*

Self-styled “Hero of the Pacific”*

Self-styled “Hero of Australia”*

Genuine hero of the press*

*Since the 1920’s, MacArthur had hired a public relations firm to manage his image.

Douglas MacArthur

1903	Second Lieutenant	Graduated 1 st academically from West Point, commissioned 2LT, Engineers
1904	First Lieutenant	Officer with 3rd Engineer Battalion, Philippines
1905	First Lieutenant	Aide-de-camp to his father
1908	First Lieutenant	CO, Company K, 3rd Engineer Battalion, Fort Leavenworth, KS
1911	Captain	Department Head, Field Engineering School
1912	Captain	War Department, Washington D,C,
1914	Captain	Headquarters Staff, Veracruz Expedition, Mexico
1917	Major	War Department, Washington, D.C.
1917	Colonel	Chief of Staff, 42nd ('Rainbow') Division, USA
1918	Brigadier General	Chief of Staff, 42nd ('Rainbow') Division, France
1919	Brigadier General	Commandant, US Military Academy, West Point
1922	Brigadier General	Staff assignments in the Philippines and the U.S.
1925	Major General	CG, III Corps Area (Washington, D.C.)
1930	General	Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, D.C.
1935	General	Military Advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines
1937	-	Retired from US Army; commissioned Field Marshal, Philippine Army
1941	Major General/General	Recalled to US Army, commanding land forces in Philippines
1942	General	Fled Philippines; Supreme Commander of the South-West Pacific Area
1944	General of the Army	Went ashore during the U.S. landing at Leyte Gulf in the Philippines
1945	General of the Army	Accepted Japan's surrender aboard the battleship, <i>Missouri</i> , in Tokyo Bay.

A shameless self-promoter and flawed man

"One cannot wage war under present conditions without the support of public opinion, which is tremendously molded by the press and other forms of propaganda." (Douglas MacArthur)

Assigned as head of the Bureau of Information at the office of the Secretary of War in June 1916, MacArthur has since been regarded as the Army's first press officer. In the 1920's MacArthur had hired a Washington D.C. public relations firm to manage his image with the American public, a move that greatly furthered his career.

Once cannot help but think that his unsuccessful nomination for the Medal of Honor and award of two Distinguished Service Crosses and seven Silver Stars was a bit excessive for the Chief of Staff of a WWI Infantry division.

"One contemporary described MacArthur as the greatest actor to ever serve as a U.S Army general while another wrote that MacArthur had a court rather than a staff."¹ "MacArthur was always playacting." (Truman)²

"Arthur MacArthur was the most flamboyantly egotistical man I had ever seen, until I met his son." (John Fairbank)

"The best and the worst things you hear about him [MacArthur] are both true." (Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey)

"I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. That's the answer to that. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail." (Truman)²

"I've given it a lot of thought, and I have finally concluded - decided that there were times when he - well, I'm afraid when he wasn't right in the head. And there never was anyone around to him to keep in line. He didn't have anyone on his staff who wasn't an ass kisser..." (Truman)²

"... a brilliant, temperamental egoist; a handsome man, who can be as charming as anyone who ever lived, or harshly indifferent to the needs and desires of those around him." "Everything about MacArthur was on a grand scale—his virtues and triumphs and shortcomings." (LTG George Brett, USAF)

1. Murray, W and AR Millett. *A War To Be Won*. Cambridge: Belknap, 2001 2. Miller, M. *Plain speaking: an oral biography of Harry S. Truman*. NY, NY: Putnam, 1974.



1LT Arthur MacArthur, Jr.
14th Wisconsin Infantry
18 years old, 1862
Won Medal of Honor, 1863
Colonel, 1864, 19 years old
(Douglas MacArthur's father)

Insights into the man

Douglas MacArthur was obsessed with emulating his father Arthur, Jr. in winning a Medal of Honor.

- An intelligence staff officer at the 1914 Battle of Veracruz, Mexico, Captain MacArthur nominated himself for one of the 56 Medals of Honor allocated by the Secretary of the Navy, without success.
- Lightly wounded when checking a gap in the lines during WWI's Meuse-Argonne Offensive in 1918, then BG MacArthur again nominated for the Medal of Honor, but was again denied.
- Finally, after six years to build up the defence of the Philippines, he presided over the loss of the undeployed US Air Force on 8/12/41, loss of the US fleet, collapse of the unprepared Philippines Army, and withdrawal of the American Army to the Bataan Peninsula. Fleeing by PT boat and B-17 to Australia in March 1942, he was awarded a political Medal of Honor "for defense of the Philippines" because the United States public "needed a hero".


Authorised only to bring his CoS when fleeing the Philippines, he brought 14 key staff, who became his key staff in Australia (and Korea).

Defense of the Philippines via Press Communique



Dec. 29, 1941 edition

- Despite poor military judgment and failings as a commander, MacArthur had a talent for self-promotion and media usage.
- His Corregidor PR office issued “142 communiques; 109 of which mentioned one man, MacArthur.”¹ While starving troops were fighting and dying, he promoted himself to Americans as the brilliant genius “Hero of the Pacific.” from his Corregidor bunker². His WWII Chief of Staff MG Sutherland conceded that MacArthur personally wrote or approved all press releases.




December 1941 edition

- “...the effect of these press releases upon the American public served to whip them up into a frenzy of fawning adulation of MacArthur, American hero,”¹ and *saved his life*.
- President Roosevelt and senior army officers were aware of the emptiness of his boasts that his troops would prevail. They knew that he had let his air power be eliminated on the ground despite nine hours advance warning. They knew he had failed to prepare the Philippines for a successful defence and even failed to support those giving a good fight.
- Seeking to motivate his sick and starving troops whom he had ordered to fight to the end, he lied that military reinforcements were on the way from the United States.

1. Connaughton, Richard. *MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines*. NY, NY: Overlook, 2001. 2. Bataan troops nicknamed him “Dugout Doug.”

Flight to Australia

- Despite advice from military officers including then BG Eisenhower to leave MacArthur in the Philippines, President Roosevelt bowed to public pressure to save MacArthur from facing capture with his troops. On 22 February he ordered MacArthur to travel to Australia for a newly-created position as Supreme Commander, South West Pacific.
- Originally to leave via submarine on 15 March, he instead left via PT boat on 11 March.
 - PT boats dramatically emphasized and personalized MacArthur’s escape.
 - They also served as a slap in the face of the US Navy based upon past disagreements.
 - They enabled him to bring his senior staff (at the cost of 42 PT boat crew left behind).
 - MacArthur was also known to be a bit claustrophobic.
- MacArthur’s B-17 touched down in the Northern Territory on 17 March. Upon reaching Melbourne on 21 March, MacArthur confided to the press that the plane had been pursued by Japanese fighter and narrowly escaped Japanese bombing as it landed. According to flight crew later on, the flight was uneventful.
- Australia rejoiced that the “hero” had come to save them. Prime Minister Curtin saw MacArthur’s arrival as a sign that the United States had come to Australia’s aid.



Maloney, Shane and Chris Grosz. "Thomas Blamey & Douglas MacArthur." *The Monthly* October 2006.

"Blamey had a sharp mind for the strategic overview, fascistic tendencies and a reputation for favouritism, womanising and drunkenness. He'd never led troops in combat, and his most famous victories had been against the bolshie jobless during his tenure as Victoria's police commissioner. Over the next three years, his staff officers were sidelined and the achievements of his troops deliberately downplayed."

Leaving the door to Australia cracked open


- MacArthur came to Australia with an obsession to return to the Philippines as a hero.
- Specifically ordered to include Australians amongst his SWPA senior staff, he instead filled his senior staff with the Bataan Gang, who lacked combat experience almost to a man.
 - He ensured his staff shared his grand vision for his triumphal return to the Philippines.
 - He deprived himself of the advice of Australians with actual war experience.
 - These two factors combined to produce poor intelligence and planning in New Guinea, blinded and deafened him to input from battlefields that he seldom visited, and led to panic-stricken responses to surprises and unrealistic demands on field commanders.
- On 23 March 1942, Australia recalled General Sir Thomas Blamey from the Middle East to be Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces. He was appointed SWPA Land Forces Commander commanding 100,000 AIF, 265,000 militia and 38,000 Americans.
- Despite knowing New Guinea's strategic importance and vulnerability to the Japanese, SWPA took no steps to fortify Port Moresby or reinforce New Guinea until the Japanese Port Moresby invasion force was turned around during the Battle of the Coral Sea in May. Even then, it only sent one additional militia brigade (14th) to Port Moresby on 15 May.

In fact, both New Guinea and Australia were wide open to Japanese attack.



Why no invasion of Australia?

- Massive troop and logistical resources would be required to conquer and hold the Australian mainland.
- The easy capture of Rabaul 23 January 1941 and bombing Darwin 19 Feb. had convinced the Japanese Army that Australian could not defend itself anyway.
- The sheer size of Australia would require immense resources to administer and Japanese Army resources were already over extended.
- Japanese gains in December 1941 had been so rapid that the Army needed some time to consolidate its territorial gains.
- The Japanese Army was confident that Australia could be pressured into surrender to Japan by isolating it completely from the United States as part of an intensified blockade, and by applying intense psychological pressure.
- Invasion by force was not ruled out if Australia did not surrender as expected.




Implementation of Operation FS

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- 28 May 1942, General Tojo calls on Australia to surrender.
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- 25 Aug 1942, Japan invades Milne Bay as stepping stone to Port Moresby/Aus.

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
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




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Reconnaissance of Sydney Harbour



Packaged for sub transport ↑
Prepared for take-off ↓



Before daylight on 30 May 1942, an E14Y Glen float-plane launched from submarine I-21 flew over Sydney. Warrant Flying officer Susumo Ito and Ordinary Seaman Iwasaki twice circled the cruiser USS Chicago before flying home. Although reported, no action was taken.

The Battle of Sydney, 1 June 1942


- On 31 May 1942, 5 Japanese cruiser submarines rendezvoused in a crescent formation just outside Sydney Heads.
- Based on intelligence collected by I-21's¹ E14Y Glen float-plane the night before, I-22², I-24² and I-27¹ would launch Type A Kō-hyōteki-class midget submarines to penetrate Sydney Harbour in order to create fear and havoc.
- This was a **psychological warfare** initiative under Japan's Operation FS.



¹ Type-B (*Otsu-gata*, I-15 class)





² Type-C (*Junsen Hei-gata*, I-16 class)



Around midnight 31 May, Japanese mother subs I-27, I-22 and I-24 released midget subs M-27, M-22 and M-24 outside Sydney Harbour.

Type A Kō-hyōteki-class submarine



Displacement:	46 long tons (47 t) submerged
Length:	23.9 m (78 ft 5 in)
Beam:	1.8 m (5 ft 11 in)
Height:	3 m (9 ft 10 in)
Propulsion:	Electric motor, 600 hp 447 kW at 1800 rpm
Speed:	•23 knots (43 kph) surfaced •19 knots (35 kph) submerged
Range:	•100 nmi (190 km) at 3.7 kph •18 nmi (33 km) at 35 kph
Test depth:	30 m (98 ft)
Crew:	2
Armament:	• 2 × 450 mm (17.7 in) torpedoes • 1 × 140 kg scuttling charge


At 8pm, M-27 entered the harbour but became entangled in an anti-torpedo net straight-away. To avoid capture, LT Chuman and PO Omori committed seppuku (harakiri) by firing the scuttling charge.


M-24 entered the harbour at about 9.48 p.m. and headed towards the Sydney Harbour Bridge. The USS Chicago fired at it when it was about 200 m from Garden Island. It fired both torpedoes at the cruiser. One ran ashore and failed to explode. The other passed under Dutch submarine K9 and exploded on the seafloor beneath the depot ship HMAS Kuttabul, killing 21 sailors (19 RAN and 2 RN), and sinking the Kuttabul. M-24 then escaped.



Its wreck was discovered in November 2006 - 30km north of the harbour and 5km out to sea.

The third submarine, M-22, was sighted by HMAS *Yandra* at the entrance to the harbour and was depth-charged. Some four hours later, having recovered, it entered the harbour, but it was subsequently attacked with depth charges and sunk in Taylor Bay by vessels of the Royal Australian Navy. LT Matsuo and PO Tsuzuki had committed suicide.













The two Japanese midget submarines sunk in Sydney Harbour were used to construct a composite midget submarine which toured Australia during the war. An exhibition tour raised money for the naval relief fund. It is now part of the Australian War Memorial's collection.



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4 June		
04:30	First Japanese takeoff against Midway Islands	
04:30	10 planes (Yorktown) begin to search for the Japanese ships	
05:34	Japanese ships detected by a PBY from Midway I.	
07:10	6 TBF Avengers and 4 USAAF B-26 (from Midway I.) attack	
07:50	67 dive bombers, 29 torpedo bombers, 20 Wildcats take off	
07:55	16 dive bombers of the US Navy (from Midway I.) attack	
08:10	17 B-17s (from Midway Islands) attack	
08:20	11 bombers of the US Navy (from Midway I.) attack	
09:06	12 torpedo bombers, 17 dive bombers, 6 Wildcats take off (Yorktown)	
09:18	Nagumo to Northeast	
09:25	15 torpedo bombers (Hornet) attack	
09:30	14 torpedo bombers (Enterprise) attack	
10:00	12 torpedo bombers (Yorktown) attack	
10:25	30 dive bombers (Enterprise) attack Akagi and Kaga	
10:25	17 dive bombers (Yorktown) attack Soryu	
11:00	18 Vals and 6 Zekes take off from Hiryu	
11:30	10 planes (Yorktown) take off to search for remaining Japanese ships	
12:05	First attack on Yorktown	
13:30	Hiryu detected; 24 dive bombers take off against Hiryu	
13:31	10 Kates and 6 Zekes take off from Hiryu	
13:40	Yorktown again in service, making 18 knots	
14:30	Second attack on Yorktown	
15:00	Yorktown abandoned  IJN Sub sinks	
16:10	Soryu sunk  IJN scuttles	
17:00	Dive bombers attack on Hiryu  IJN scuttles	
19:25	Kaga sunk  IJN scuttles	
5 June		
05:00	Akagi sunk 	
09:00	Hiryu sun 	





IJN carrier *Soryu* tries to avoid attackers.




DC Digital Colored Photograph.

IJN carrier *Kaga* before Midway.



IJN carrier *Kaga* (L) heads towards Pearl Harbor with *Zuikaku*.



IJN carrier *Akagi* burns after attack.




Impact on USS Yorktown of torpedo from one of Lieutenant Hashimoto's B5N Kate torpedo planes.



IJN carrier *Hiryu* shortly before sinking.



 United States	 Empire of Japan
3 carriers	4 carriers
7 heavy cruisers	2 battleships
1 light cruiser	2 heavy cruisers
15 destroyers	1 light cruiser
233 carrier-based aircraft	12 destroyers
127 land-based aircraft	248 carrier-based aircraft
	16 floatplanes
Casualties	
1 carrier sunk	4 carriers sunk
1 destroyer sunk	1 heavy cruiser sunk
150 aircraft destroyed	248 aircraft destroyed
304 KIA, 3 CIA (executed)	3,057 KIA, 37 CIA

Post Midway, Operation FS discontinued, then cancelled

The rationale given in TOP SECRET Imperial Headquarters documents was (partial listing):

- Japan lost 400 carrier and land-based aircraft in Battles of Coral Sea and Midway.
- With reduction in carrier fleet, essential to smash Allied air with base invasion operations.
- Allied fighters caused considerable damage during daytime air raids by Japanese bombers.
- The campaign in New Guinea has developed into a war of attrition.
- Allied airpower at Moresby has increased since start of July (est. 40 bombers); Japanese fighter planes “unable to shoot them down.” Japanese pilots ram bombers to bring down.
- Japanese aircraft production rates are low (<90 fighters/month); no prospect of increase.
- “The truth is that we have fallen into a huge rut.” Aircraft numbers are 54% below full complement for fighters, 37% for recon planes, 75% for bombers and 80% for flying boats.
- Although Allies suffered great damage in New Guinea and Port Moresby from aggressive air attacks, they are quick to reinforce and mount bomber counter-attacks. Chances are “extremely high” that they will “take complete control of the air war.”
- It is imperative to neutralize Allied air at Port Moresby. If they lose POM, they will struggle to exert land-based air power in New Guinea or Pacific.

Japanese strategic thinking

IJN Navy

- Apply naval strength to Indian Ocean rather than Pacific.*
- Abandon plans to restage the Midway Operation.
- Navy no confidence of success in blockade between Australia and US.
- Speed is of essence in attack on Port Moresby.

IJN Army

- Attack Chungking and/or joint Army/Navy incursions into India and western Asia in concert with Germany.*
- Better to break US spirit by forcing Britain to surrender than continuing direct actions.
- Must invade and secure Port Moresby (leaning towards overland route).

* Burma was about to fall, pressure building on India, Germany and Italy winning in Africa.

Japanese Feasibility Study of Overland Route to POM

- Preliminary map study findings:
 - Buna-Kokoda is 100 air km, but 160 km by land. Kokoda-POM 120 km direct, but 200 km by land. This route requires over 360 kilometres of trudging.
 - The problem is securing supplies, all transported by human carriers.
 - For 5,000 fighters requiring 600 grams of food per person per day, 3 tonnes/day of food required. 230 carriers per day must reach the front line, requiring 4,600 carriers just to the saddle. To POM requires 32,000 carriers.
 - If one considers munitions and other supplies, the requirement for carriers would be immense. The overland route is probably not possible unless a road for transport can be pushed out from Buna.
- Nevertheless, an engineering regiment advance party was directed to carry out a detailed reconnaissance of the Buna-POM track and roads along the Kumusi and Mambare Rivers, repair roads, and stockpile ordnance.
- Results of the reconnaissance would determine if the operation would proceed.

The Japanese defeat at Midway indeed changed everything! The Allies were now in a position to counterattack. Offensive plans were quickly evolved:

- Assuming he would command all operations, General MacArthur proposed his **TULSA Plan** to thrust through New Guinea and the Solomons to seize Rabaul.
- The US Navy argued that Tulagi would have to be taken and secured before any final attack on Rabaul. They also objected to MacArthur being in charge of any amphibious operations.
- Finally, on 2 July 1942, General George Marshall (Chairman JCS) came up with a draft directive that divided the operation into three tasks:

VAdm. Robert L. Ghormley
CinC, South Pacific Area


Task One. Seizure and occupation of the Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacent positions (e.g., Guadalcanal).

General Douglas MacArthur
CinC, Southwest Pacific Area

Task Two. Seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomon Islands, Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast coast of New Guinea.

General Douglas MacArthur
CinC, Southwest Pacific Area

Task Three. Seizure and occupation of Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Guinea-New Ireland area.



Priority 1 - Task 1

Seize/occupy Santa Cruz Is., Tulagi and adjacent positions

South West Pacific Area

- Supply naval reinforcements and land-based air in support of Task 1.
- Provide for the interdiction of enemy air and naval activities westward of the operating areas.

South Pacific Area

- Prime responsibility.
- Execute by 1 August 1942.

NOTE: US Marine invasion of Tulagi began at 0600 and Guadalcanal at 0900 on 7 August 1942. Tulagi, Tamamboga and Gavutu conquered 8 August. The Guadalcanal Campaign lasted until February 1943 against heavy Japanese land, sea and air resistance (e.g., photo shows 8/8/42 Japanese aerial attack on US Navy supply vessels waiting to unload at Guadalcanal.)

Priority 2 - Task 2


Seize/occupy Bougainville and north coast of New Guinea.

South West Pacific Area

- Prime responsibility.
- Prepare for early offensive action to seize and occupy New Guinea Coast and adjacent inland areas from Milne Bay in the south to Wewak in the north.

South Pacific Area

- Lend SWPA the fullest possible support with aircraft, submarine, and naval resources.



Priority 3 - Task 3

Seize/occupy Rabaul and adjacent New Guinea positions.

South West Pacific Area

- Prime responsibility.
- Prepare for early offensive action to seize and occupy Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Britain, New Ireland area of New Guinea.

South Pacific Area

- Lend SWPA the fullest possible support with aircraft, submarine, and naval resources.

MacArthur busts some moves

- ### 1

MG Brett (who had pointed out that bombers need airstrips) was replaced as CG Allied Air Forces by MG Kenney. General Brett was sent to the US.

2

The US Army supply echelon in Australia was incorporated under BG Marshall, SWPA, on 20 July. General Barnes was sent to the US for reassignment.
- ### 3

GHQ, SWPA moved from Melbourne to Brisbane on 20 July.

4

US antiaircraft units in Perth were moved to Townsville.
- ### 5

The 41st Division moved from Melbourne to Rockhampton 12 July.

6

The 32nd Division moved from Adelaide to Brisbane 13 July.
- ### 7

I Corps CG MG Richardson arrived in July but voiced an opinion and was replaced by MG Eichelberger. General Richardson returned to the US for reassignment.

8

Airfield construction in the forward areas was accelerated; two Engineer Battalions shifted to New Guinea on 21 July. 808th to POM and 2/46th to Milne Bay.

Revision of the OPERATION TULSA Plan

SWPA GHQ began extensive planning to undertake Task 2, Seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomon Islands, Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast coast of New Guinea.

Strategic overview: capture a Japanese weak point with minimal losses, construct an airfield, and then to use air power to cut off supplies to Japanese troops who had been bypassed.

Item 1. Establish an airfield in the Buna area to support operations against Lae and Salamaua.

Task 1.1. Reconnoitre whether Buna emergency strip had any military value and, if not, find a suitable all weather site elsewhere in the area. Completed 12/7/1942.

Outcome. Existing strip was worthless, but Dobodura 15 miles south was well suited.

Task 1.2. Establish an airfield at Dobodura with all possible speed.

Task 1.2.1. Develop a general scheme of manoeuvre for the occupation of Buna. Complete 13/7.

Task 1.2.2. Develop a plan to prepare and defend a Dobodura airfield.

Outcome. OPERATION PROVIDENCE planned 15/7. BUNA FORCE was to establish an airstrip suitable for 3 pursuit squadrons capable of expansion to 3 pursuit and 2 heavy bomber units.

Concept of Operation. Take possession of area, provide immediate AA defense, unload supplies prior to discovery; take no steps to build Dobodura airdrome until Serial Three. Japs diverted by KANGA FORCE and Allied Air attacks on Lae and Salamaua before and during OPERATION PROVIDENCE.

Movement plan. Four serials would invest Buna area with air cover from POM and Milne Bay.

Serial 1. Four Aus Inf Coy and US Engineer advance party to depart POM D-11 via Kokoda Trail to arrive Buna D-1 to secure area and prepare for succeeding serials.

Serial 2. 250 US troops (enr, sigs, AA, port) to ETA Buna on D-Day via 2 coastal ships.

Serial 3. Main serial w/30 days stores under Aust BG ETA Buna on D+1 via coastal convoy.

Serial 4. US Engr Company and ground crews from Townsville ETA Buna on D+14 via sea.

Other aspects of the OPERATION PROVIDENCE Plan

- No clearing or other work was to be started at Dobodura until the engineers and protective troops had disembarked and the ships arriving D+1 had been unloaded.
- Success was dependent upon secrecy in preparation and execution. Every precaution was to be taken to conceal the movement, its destination, and its intent. Above all, the existence of the airdrome was to be concealed from the Japanese as long as possible.
- Movement orders for the first three serials were issued on 17 July.
 - Serial One ETD POM Friday 31 August, ETA Buna on 10-11 August a few days after Guadalcanal landing (scheduled for 7 August 1942 [NOTE: Actual – 8 August 1942]).
 - Serial Two ETA Buna Wednesday 12 August.
 - Serial Three ETA Buna Thursday 13 August bringing heavy stores and 30d subsistence.
 - Serial Four ETA Buna from Townsville Wednesday 26 August.
- BG Robert H. Van Volkenburgh, commanding general of the 40th Artillery Brigade (AA) at Port Moresby, was to be task force commander with control of the troops while they were moving to Buna. An Australian brigadier would take command at Buna itself.

Field Intelligence (Coast Watchers and Allied Air)

- Two local intelligence messages reached POM 18 February 1942.
- 24 large ships sighted Rabaul Harbour 17 July 1942.**
- Est. Japanese Regt loaded on trawlers or fishing boats sighted off Talasea, New Britain.**
- BG von Volkenburgh contacted COL Larr in Townsville to discuss.
 - A Japanese move on Buna may be imminent.
 - Serial One might reach Buna too late.
 - Alternate plan to airlift Serial One via PBVs immediately with PBVs to then return for Serial Two. Priority for AA battery to arrive Buna via flying boat NLT 21 July. Rest of PROVIDENCE to also be accelerated. BUNA FORCE to be resupplied entirely by air.
- 18 July 1942. COL Larr at once got GHQ SWPA by phone, speaking with MG Sutherland, Chief of Staff. Ended call with "We may be able to hold Buna if we get there first."
- 19 July 1942. GHQ SWPA G3 BG Chamberlain radioed. "Jap troops and ships sighted not necessarily for Buna. Nor has surprise been lost. Suggested plan lacks strength and may draw enemy landing. **Adhere to PROVIDENCE.** D-Day must follow Guadalcanal landing."

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Oops!


Who can I blame for this SNAFU?

WILLOUGHBY!!!



P PLANNING AND DOING **G**

“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week.”




Order of Battle – Buna-Gona-Kokoda Area, July 1942




Yokoyama Force (First Wave)

Colonel Yokoyama Yosuke
4,400 troops



Kokoda Advance LTC Hatsuo Tsukamoto




Maroubra Force



LTC William Owen
arr. Kokoda drome
24 July 1942


Maroubra Force
(HQ July 1942
Port Moresby)



MAJ William T Watson
Troops spread over coast



CPT Samuel V Templeton
arrived Kokoda overland
12 July 1942



1. Japanese landings
2. Minor skirmishes with Papuan Infantry Battalion
3. Firefight 24/7 as 39th/PIR destroy Kumasi Bridge.
4. Japanese cross Kumasi River in rubber rafts.
5. 100 Allies ambush Japanese; kill 2, wound 13.
6. Several planeloads Aussies arrive at Kokoda.
7. B/39th under CPT Sam Templeton make stand; nearly encircled, heavy casualties, CO captured.
8. Survivors withdraw to Deniki guided by PIR Lance Corporal Sanopa around Japs; link up with airlifted reinforcements and stragglers.




21 July 1942

- Naval units debarked at Giruwa at 0530. 1,800 combat troops landed.
- The Yokoyama Advance Party at 0700. They mistakenly landed at Gona, an Anglican Mission and Hospital, instead of Basabua.
- Landings continued into the morning of 22 July.
- CPT Tetsuo Ogawa's company of the 1/144 struck inland for Kokoda by truck.
- Japanese believed PIB had 500-600 native troops in the area.
- Supply and base troops and Rabaul natives began building bases at Gona and at Buna, a small government outpost.
- Prior to the Japanese landings, there was only one company of 39th Infantry Battalion (Militia) at Kokoda Village with observers at Buna and Gona.
- There was relatively little resistance to the landings.
- MAJ Watson's PIB (105 Papuans and 6 Australians) felled trees across roads.
- Upon hearing of the landing, the 39th Bn (Militia) in Port Moresby under LTC William T. Owen was ordered to join Company B in Kokoda to travel by air (as available) and overland.
- Europeans in the area either fled or hid. They had all heard how Japanese treated civilian and military prisoners.

21 July 1942

Four Anglican mission stations – Gona, Buna, Isivita and Sangara – were in the vicinity. The expatriate staff went into hiding in the jungle. These included:-



- Isivita: Rev. Henry Holland and Mr. John Duffill
- Sangara: Rev. Vivian Redlich, Sister Margery Brenchley and Lilla Lashmar
- Gona: Rev. James Benson, Sister May Hayman and Mavis Parkinson

Also, after hiding, all fell into Japanese hands and, other than Rev Benson, who was captured separately and sent to a Rabaul camp, all were executed.

The first two groups were amongst ten people beheaded on Buna beach by was Sub-Lieut. Komai on 12 August.

May and Mavis were made to stand by pre-dug graves near Popondetta and bayoneted on 28 August.

22 July 1942

- Eighteen Zero fighters covered from 1045-1615. Weather prevented earlier coverage.
- The naval landing party occupied Buna at 0700 on 22 July and began constructing a base.
- Main strength of Advance Party proceeded to Buna.
- CPT Tetsuo's Kokoda party proceeded from Gona and Giruwa to Soputa along a passable 40km road.
- From 0600, 100 Allied planes attacked the anchorages in six or seven waves. *Ayatozan Maru* was hit at 0710 and sunk, with 40 KIA and vehicular cargo lost. IJN Destroyer *Uzuki* was hit and forced to return to Rabaul.
- A/39 was ordered to Awala to ambush the Japanese Advance.
- CPT Templeton determined that Kokoda would be difficult to defend so left B/39 in Kokoda and established a defensive position with the main force at Deniki.

23 July 1942

- At Awala on 23 July, the unit defeated “approximately thirty native troops and then one hundred Australian troops.”
- 11 Platoon B/39 and PIB troops ambushed Japs at Awala. About 100 Allies faced 900 Japanese.
- The enemy struck just as the B/39 commander, company HQ and one platoon reached the Awala area.
- After a short skirmish, the Allies withdrew and took up a defensive position just short of the Wairopa Bridge over the Kumusi River.
- C/39 moved out of Port Moresby to the head of the Kokoda Track and began moving towards Kokoda.

Japanese Tactics

The Japanese were using tactics tried and proved in Malaya - when they met opposition, they immediately attempted to outflank it and cut it off. They used their artillery and mortars, of which the Australians had none, to good effect.

They crawled along beneath the undergrowth to attack and climbed trees to snipe.

24 July 1942

- The Japanese advanced to high ground at Oivi about 16 km east of Kokoda.
- With the Japanese force closing in, B/39 pulled back over the Wairopa Bridge and then destroyed it.
- They then attempted to ambush enemy river crossing attempts.
- Only one small plane in Port Moresby was capable of landing at the Kokoda airdrome.
- LTC Owen arrived at Kokoda by air to find little that could be done against the much larger Japanese force. He radioed a request for two companies be flown to Kokoda.

The Wairopa Bridge

25 July 1942

- Destruction of the Wairopa Bridge did not hold up the Japanese force for long. By the 25th, they had a hasty bridge over the Kumusi River and were rapidly advancing towards Kokoda.
- The Japanese attacked the resistance at Gorari with mortars, machine guns, and light field pieces and quickly outflanked Templeton's small force.
- The Japanese followed the withdrawing Templeton to Oivi and launched a strong attack on Templeton's position at Oivi.
- Captain Templeton with his two platoons and some PIB (about 60 men) ambushed some 500 Japanese at the village of Gorari, eight miles west of Wairopa.
- Forced to withdraw from Gorari, Templeton staged a fighting withdrawal to Oivi, a point in the steep foothills of the range, only eight miles by trail from Kokoda.

26 July 1942

- The main strength of the advance party joined up at Oivi on 26 July.
- The Japanese attacked the resistance at Oivi with mortars, machine guns, and light field pieces, launching repeated attacks on Templeton's position at Oivi.
- Waves of air attacks during successive days forced the Japanese to move only at night.
- In the early morning, the small plane made two flights from Port Moresby to Kokoda, bringing in 30 men of D/39. LTC Owen sent half to Oivi to reinforce Templeton, and held half at Kokoda.
- Despite repeated frontal and flank attacks on Oivi over the next six hours the Japanese failed to break through.
- At 1700, CPT Templeton went alone along the Track to warn expected men coming forward. He was captured.
- LCpl Sanopa (PIB) led the Oivi survivors to Deniki through a creek below Oivi.
- After notifying Port Moresby notice of his intentions, LTC Owen burned what couldn't be carried and evacuated Kokoda before midnight to Deniki.

27 July 1942

- The Japanese searched the deserted Kokoda and withdrew to their main camp near Oivi.
- The track from the coast at Gona was improved, and estimates developed of additional work required to support the coming overland assault on Port Moresby.
- The Allies linked up at Deniki. LTC Owen realised that Watson and others thought lost at Oivi had arrived at Deniki before him.
- LTC Owen's message requesting reinforcements arrived late morning.
- With another suitable plane from Australia, two planes were enroute to Kokoda with troops and supplies. They were hastily recalled to Port Moresby.
- Six Australian soldiers inadvertently left behind at Oivi the night before entered Kokoda, astonished to find the village unoccupied and the supplies burned. Famished, they scavenged a basic meal from the smouldering fires. Totally exhausted, they bedded down.

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
28 July 1942

- The Japanese advised HQ they had reached Kokoda, operating from Oivi.
- Missionary Lucien Tapiedi was killed by unfriendly villagers near Sewa. Rev. Redlich, Sister Brenchley and Miss Lashmar were turned over to the Japs.
- Two more suitable planes arrived from Australia, making four in total that could land at Kokoda Airdrome, suitable to lift an entire company.
- At first light, LTC Owen discovered that the Japanese had not occupied Kokoda in force. Leaving about 40 to hold Deniki, he led 77 exhausted men forward and re-occupied Kokoda by 1130. He sent an URGENT message.



Re-occupied Kokoda. Fly in reinforcements including 2 Platoon and four detachments of mortars. Drome opened. Owen.

- Two Douglas transports carrying reinforcements from 39 Battalion circled the airfield, but the pilots refused to land and returned to POM.
- Owen set up a defensive perimeter.



29 July 1942

- The Japanese under CPT Ogawa stormed the escarpment at 0230 and met fierce resistance. After hours of savage fighting, the outnumbered Australians were again driven out of Kokoda. The Japanese had knee mortars and a 70mm howitzer
- CPT Ogawa and 20 of his men were killed in the fighting.
- Australian prisoners of war captured at Kokoda set out the situation of the Australian forces at that time. It is said that CPT Templeton advised the enemy that they were facing 1,000 troops, with another 100,000 in Port Moresby.
- The Japanese occupied Kokoda and the adjacent airstrip. Having achieved their objective, they did not pursue the Allies.
- LTC Owen moved brazenly among the men, opting for leadership over safety. The Aussies responded fiercely with rifle fire and hand grenades but casualties mounted especially from the 70mm gun.
- About one hour into the firefight, LTC Owen received a mortal sniper wound in the head. Some Japs infiltrated the line.
- MAJ Watson of the PIB now in command extricated the surviving Australians and withdrew to Deniki in a heavy mist.
- Two privates in a rear guard waited in Kokoda until the Japanese were almost on top of them, and shot about 15 before withdrawing to Deniki.

Kokoda lost this morning. Blow the drome and road east of Oivi. Watson.



Members of 39th moving south along the track with wounds sustained in July/August battles. Reaching hospital required six days walking.



September 1942 muster of 39th Infantry Battalion in Port Moresby.



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OPERATION WATCHTOWER

(BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL)

7 August 1942 to 9 February 1943

U.S. Marines disembarking from LCP (L) at Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942.

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The Battle of Milne Bay (24 August – mid September 1942)

“Where we turned ‘em back!”